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A Flame Kept Burning: Counterinsurgency Support After the Cold War
STEVEN METZ

From Parameters, Autumn 1995, pp. 31-41.
The insurgents of the world are sleeping. Outside the former Soviet Union, few new insurgencies have emerged since
the end of the Cold War, and many old ones, from the Philippines to Peru, from Mozambique to El Salvador, from
Northern Ireland to Israel, are lurching toward political settlement. But sleep is not death--it is a time for rejuvenation.
Since the means and the motives for protracted political violence persist, it will prove as attractive to the discontented
of the world in the post-Cold War global security environment as it did before. Eventually insurgency will awaken.
When it does, the United States will be required to respond.
Since the late 1940s, the importance of counterinsurgency in American national security strategy has ebbed and
flowed. Often it was not considered strategically significant and the defense community paid it little attention. When
the President did decide that insurgency posed a threat, as during the Kennedy and first Reagan administrations, the
military and the defense community had to craft or update an appropriate conceptual framework, organization, and
doctrine. Like a phoenix, American counterinsurgency capability periodically died, only to be reborn from the ashes.
One determinant of this process was how the period of remission was spent. When a cadre of counterinsurgency
experts within the military and defense community used it to ponder past efforts and analyze the changing nature of
insurgency, the reconstitution of understanding and capability was relatively easy.
Today, there is no pressing strategic rationale for US engagement in counterinsurgency, but history suggests that if the
United States remains involved in the Third World, one may emerge. This is the time, then, for introspection,
assessment, and reflection--for keeping the intellectual flame burning. Just as combat units train after an operation in
order to prepare for future ones (while hoping they never occur), the US military and other elements of the defense
community must train mentally for future counterinsurgency. To do this now will shorten the period of learning and
adaptation should counterinsurgency support again become an important part of our national security strategy.
The Post-Cold War Security Environment
The evolution of US counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine has been shaped by Vietnam and El Salvador. After
Vietnam, specialists considered the essence of US counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine sound, but concluded that it
had not been applied properly in Southeast Asia. US counter- insurgency support in El Salvador thus did not require a
radical revision of either strategy or doctrine, but simply better application.[1] This was correct. Despite some stark
differences, Vietnam and El Salvador both occurred within the same strategic environment. In terms of the broad
nature of the threat and the wider geostrategic concerns that shaped American decisionmaking, Vietnam and El
Salvador shared more features than not.
Today, US counterinsurgency strategy continues to assume that the wisdom gained in Southeast Asia and Central
America holds. El Salvador is thought to have proven the correctness of our strategy and doctrine. "The El Salvador
experience," Victor Rosello writes, "generally validated the US Army's Foreign Internal Defense doctrine in countering
insurgency."[2] But future counterinsurgency may not emulate the past; the similarities between Vietnam and El
Salvador may be much greater than those between El Salvador and what comes after it. Since the strategic
environment determines the form and salience of insurgency, the United States now needs to revise its
counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. Some trends in the post-Cold War strategic environment may inhibit
insurgency; others will simply force it to mutate. Many of them, though, will alter the strategic calculus for the United
States, leading policymakers to reconsider where, when, why, and how they engage in counterinsurgency support.
In his seminal book Political Order in Changing Societies, Samuel Huntington argued that political development

entails the creation and maintenance of institutions capable of dealing with demands on the state.[3] The contemporary
Third World is undergoing mitosis, splitting into those able to craft adaptive and viable institutions and those unable to
do so. Success at institution-building is manifested in the global trend toward democracy.[4] Since functioning
democracies are less susceptible to insurgency, even if not altogether exempt, this is good news. Failed institutionbuilding results, at best, in the division of states into sub-national units with security the purview of warlords and
militias. At worst, the outcome is anarchy and a Hobbesian war of all against all.
Robert Kaplan, among others, contends that the trend toward anarchy will eventually win out and much of the Third
World will see "the withering away of central governments, the rise of tribal and regional domains, the unchecked
spread of disease, and the growing pervasiveness of war."[5] Afghanistan, where "there is no civil law, no government,
no economy--only guns and drugs and anger," may portend the Third World's future.[6]
While political results are mixed, macroeconomic trends favor fragmentation over sustainable democracy. Despite the
economic take-off of a few states, most of the Third World seems unable to sustain a level of economic growth able to
keep pace with population. The transformation to democracy can take place in a stagnant economy, but it cannot be
sustained.
A second related trend is the routinization of violence. Crime becomes omnipresent. While crime is growing in nearly
all countries, this trend is most threatening in developing countries where un- and underemployment are epidemic and
police forces are overwhelmed, ineffective, or corrupt. In much of the Third World, walls topped by concertina wire
and backed by elaborate alarm systems are standard on even middle-class homes. In poorer neighborhoods, dirtfloored, single-room houses have thick bars on the windows. More and more businesses have their own heavily armed
guards. In Panama, for instance, one sees frozen yogurt shops protected by men with M-16s.
Worse yet, the global routinization of violence has spawned entire generations for whom protracted conflict is normal.
Whether in Lebanon, Gaza, Afghanistan, Cambodia, Colombia, or Liberia, youth see violence not as an aberration, but
as an intrinsic part of life. It takes little to spark insurgency in such a context.
On the positive side, the end of the Cold War delegitimized the sponsorship of insurgency as an element of a state's
national security policy. Only pariah states like Iran dabble in exporting insurgency and terrorism. The end of the Cold
War also allowed a surge in the ability of the United Nations to cobble together coalitions for peacekeeping and to
broker negotiated solutions to conflict.
The end of the Cold War did not end the US commitment to global engagement, but it has led us to redefine national
interests. American leaders have long had little tolerance for military casualties in areas without clear national
interests--witness Reagan's withdrawal from Beirut. With the demise of the superpower competition, the areas and
issues worth spilling blood for have shrunk.
The Changing Nature of Insurgency
As the strategic environment changes, insurgency itself is mutating. Maoist "people's war," after all, was a reflection of
the Cold War security environment. Now new forms of insurgency appear to be emerging. Distilled to its essence, a
revolutionary strategy includes goals and methods. The goals of Maoist "people's war" were the seizure of political
power and the revolutionary transformation of the political and economic systems. Its methods were political and
guerrilla warfare, followed if necessary by conventional military action. Post-Cold War insurgents may seek political,
social, and economic transformation that is revolutionary in its extent, but not necessarily revolutionary in the Marxist
sense of building a new system. For instance, reactionary insurgency, in which a religious-based group attempts to
seize power from a secular, modernizing government--as the Iranians did in 1979--may be common. In some ways this
will also emulate Cold War revolutionary insurgency in that legitimacy will be the focus, control of the state the goal,
and external support important. Tactically, however, future reactionary insurgents will largely be urban with an
emphasis on terrorism rather than on rural guerrilla war. This type of insurgency will be most dangerous if it again
becomes a technique of interstate conflict, with external sponsors using insurgency to weaken an opponent.
Other post-Cold War insurgent movements will not seek to seize the state in order to change the political, social, and
economic system. Many regions of the Global South will suffer from what Larry Cable calls "defensive" insurgency,

where some subgroup within a state, whether ethnic, tribal, racial, or religious, seeks autonomy or outright
independence.[7] Given the extent of primal conflict in the post-Cold War world, such secessionist- separatist
insurgencies may be the dominant form during the next decade. This form is also the closest to traditional "people's
war," since the insurgents will place great stock in the creation of "liberated zones." But where Maoists based
mobilization and support on political ideology, secessionist insurgents will use primal ties. This will alter the essence
of counterinsurgency. When the opponent was Maoist, the government could build legitimacy by offering the people a
better deal than the insurgents. When the roots of the conflict are primal, with the government controlled by a different
group than the insurgents, legitimacy will be extraordinarily difficult, perhaps impossible, for the regime to win. As
bitter struggles in Peru and Guatemala have shown, the tendency will be for the government to consider all members
of the group supporting the insurgency as enemies. And from a regional perspective, secessionist- separatist
insurgencies will be particularly dangerous since they can easily spill over state borders.
What can be called commercial insurgency also will pose security threats without seeking the outright seizure of state
power.[8] Commercial insurgency will be a form of what is becoming known as "gray area phenomena"--powerful
criminal organizations with a political veneer and the ability to threaten national security rather than just law and
order.[9] In fact, many commercial insurgencies may see an alliance of those for whom political objectives are
preeminent and the criminal dimension simply a necessary evil, and those for whom the accumulation of wealth
through crime is the primary objective and politics simply a rhetorical veneer to garner some support that they might
not otherwise gain. It is this political component that distinguishes commercial insurgents from traditional organized
crime. Most often, though, commercial insurgencies probably will not attempt to rule the state but will seek instead a
compliant regime that allows them to pursue criminal activity unimpeded. If that is impossible, they will use persistent
violence to weaken and distract the state. In many ways, commercial insurgency has the longest historic lineage-quasi-political bandits and pirates, from Robin Hood to Carlos Lehder, have posed pervasive security threats
throughout history. Better-organized commercial insurgents will rely on such activities as the production and shipment
of drugs. Anarchic commercial insurgents such as the current rebel movements in Sierra Leone and Liberia will simply
loot.[10]
Another emerging form of insurgency will be aimed at multinational political organizations and military forces
attempting to stabilize failed states. These will emulate anticolonial conflicts in Algeria, Angola, and the first phase of
Vietnam as the insurgents play on nationalism and, to an extent, racial divisions. Since public support in the nations
providing the multinational force will often be precarious or weak, the insurgents will need only to create instability
and cause casualties among the multinational force. Somalia is a prototype for this new type of insurgency.
Within this array of goals, the methods used by insurgents will vary according to the nature of the regime they oppose
and the extent of their support network. If the legitimacy of the regime is weak, insurgents may follow something like
Maoist techniques. If the regime is a democracy with at least moderately strong legitimacy, insurgents may pursue
what US Army doctrine calls "subversive insurgency." This will combine a legitimate, above-ground element
participating in the political process and an underground using political or criminal violence to weaken or delegitimize
the government. It thus can also be called camouflaged insurgency. The insurgents will camouflage the connection
between the above-ground and underground elements for two reasons. They will try to avoid alienating potential allies
opposed to the regime but not in favor of violence, and they will seek to complicate attempts by the government to
obtain outside assistance. It is much easier for a regime to acquire international support to fight an avowed
revolutionary insurgency than to oppose a camouflaged insurgency that gives all the appearance of general disorder or
widespread crime. When the underground element does destabilize the state and the above-ground element seizes
power, the immediate problem for the new government will be reining in its violent wing. It will first attempt
cooptation. Failing that, the government will have all of the intelligence needed to violently crush the underground,
thus cementing its legitimacy by bringing order and stability.
For the United States, subversive insurgencies may pose intractable strategic problems because they will strike at
fragile democracies, and because their covert nature will make early intervention difficult. Like many forms of
insurgency, camouflaged insurgency will be difficult to recognize until it is so far developed that cures are painful.
The Changing Strategic Calculus

In combination, changes in the strategic environment and mutations in insurgency undercut the basic assumptions of
US counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine. For example, during the Cold War, American policymakers often
assumed that the costs of not acting when a friendly government faced a Marxist insurgency outweighed the potential
risks and costs of engagement. In the post-Cold War strategic environment, this may hold only when insurgents intend
to destabilize their neighbors. Marxism was a proselytizing ideology. From Leon Trotsky to Daniel Ortega, its
adherents linked their own political survival to spreading the revolution. Future insurgents may not automatically come
to the same conclusion, particularly if they see that destabilizing neighbors and spreading the insurgency is likely to
provoke serious international involvement, making them less, rather than more, secure.
This prospect carries important implications for the United States. Victory by non-proselytizing insurgents, even those
ideologically hostile to the United States, is unlikely to threaten our interests. Existing policy and strategy suggest two
reasons for US concern for insurgency. One is an updated "domino theory." If most post-Cold War insurgents do not
seek to spread violence, however, this argument weakens. It is also true that it is easier to contain a radical state run by
former insurgents than to prevent insurgent victory. The other reason for American concern is access to raw materials
and markets. But, as Benjamin S. Schwarz writes, "America's essential interests very rarely depend upon which group
controls resources or power within underdeveloped countries. . . . [B]asic American economic interests seem relatively
secure whatever happens politically in the Third World."[11] This does not mean that the United States has no
economic interests in the Third World, but simply that who holds power there will have only a marginal effect on those
interests. Since victorious insurgents must undertake post-conflict national reconstruction, they are unlikely to stop
exporting raw materials. They may be more likely to close their markets, but these are often insignificant anyway. And,
even if victorious insurgents did deny the United States access to a resource or market, the costs to the United States
would ultimately be less than the burden of protracted counterinsurgency support to regain access.
In the post-Cold War security environment, the costs and risks of counterinsurgency are increasingly altering the basic
strategic calculus. Counterinsurgency always risks damaging the United States' credibility, either by association with a
repressive or corrupt regime, or by staking our prestige on the outcome of a conflict and forcing us to choose between
the economic costs of engagement or the political costs of disengagement. Put simply, a government in serious danger
of defeat by an insurgency is often a bad ally. Hypothetically, we could engage in counterinsurgencies only where the
beleaguered government is not so bad. But this is extraordinarily difficult, mostly because of the way the United States
usually becomes involved in counterinsurgency. Rather than making a rational cost-benefit assessment and then
committing assistance until the end of the conflict, we stumble in and persist as the political costs of disengagement
mount. During the Cold War, we often rushed in to bail out governments facing imminent defeat and then found that
rather than a summer romance, we had entered a marriage. In the post-Cold War period, our involvement in
counterinsurgency may grow out of peace operations, but it will still be inadvertent more often than not. The Clinton
Administration's national security strategy does not specifically mention counterinsurgency other than "nation
assistance" in Latin America, but its emphasis on global engagement, expanding democracy, and supporting peace
operations opens the way for inadvertent involvement.[12]
American engagement in counterinsurgency also risks damaging the social, political, and economic system of the
friendly state. For South Vietnam, our cure may not have been worse than the disease, but it was close. In El Salvador
we were able to avoid damaging the state and society to the extent that we did in Vietnam, but a regime may eschew
badly needed reform and negotiation with insurgents if it thinks American assistance will allow outright victory. It is
possible that the Salvadoran military recognized that the collapse of the Soviet Union spelled the end of massive US
support, and thus finally allowed a negotiated settlement that could have been reached several years earlier. American
involvement in counterinsurgency, then, is often like lending money to a chronic gambler--it postpones real resolution
of the problem rather than solving it.
Counterinsurgency can also damage our own institutions and morale. The erosion of national purpose and respect for
authority engendered by Vietnam has taken years to ameliorate and may never be fully cured. Future American
engagement in counterinsurgency might also provoke domestic terrorism. With easy global transportation, the
existence of a variety of emigre communities in the United States, and a perception of the American public's
unwillingness to accept casualties from peripheral conflicts, insurgents could open an "American front" and target
public health, financial networks, communications systems, and the ecology.

During the Cold War, the United States assumed that only we were willing and able to provide effective
counterinsurgency support. This was always questionable. Often the British and French better understood revolutionary
insurgency than we did. And other states proved to be effective suppliers of counterinsurgency support, such as the
Israelis and Taiwanese in Guatemala. In the post-Cold War security environment, the most effective counterinsurgency
support may come from military institutions with extensive experience either as counterinsurgents--the South Africans,
Israelis, Peruvians, Filipinos, Colombians, and Salvadorans, for instance--or those such as the Zimbabweans which
were once insurgents themselves. Thus there may be others both willing and able to provide counterinsurgency support
in the post-Cold War security environment. US effort might be better spent augmenting the planning, intelligence,
sustainment, and mobility capabilities of such regional counterinsurgents than directly aiding a threatened regime.
Finally, our Cold War-era counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine assumed we understood insurgency better than the
threatened regime. Whether this was true or not, there is little evidence that we fully grasp the motives, fears, and
hopes driving emerging forms of insurgency. We are particularly likely to fail against insurgents driven by intangible
motives like justice, dignity, and the attainment of personal meaning and identity. If, in Martin van Creveld's words,
"future war will be waged for the souls of men," the United States will face overwhelming difficulties in
counterinsurgency.[13] As our limited experience with "holy terrorists" in the Middle East shows, we are ill-equipped
to deal with the root causes of religion-driven violence.[14]
In the post-Cold War strategic environment, then, counterinsurgency is increasingly becoming a high risk/low benefit
activity. The US military and defense community must make policymakers aware of this while simultaneously
watching for changes in the strategic calculus.
Conclusions
American counterinsurgency strategy and doctrine must be revised to reflect the post-Cold War strategic environment.
Because counterinsurgency is not a central element of our current national security strategy, such revision must deal
with broad concepts rather than specifics, thus paving the way for a reconstitution of capability should the strategic
calculus change and a new rationale for counterinsurgency emerge.
The first step should be conceptual expansion. Our notion of insurgency itself must be expanded to reflect the
complexity of the new security environment. The first post-Cold War revision of FM 100-20--now called Operations
Other Than War--recognizes the variegation of insurgency that followed the collapse of the Soviet Union. While
continuing to emphasize Maoist "people's war," the manual pays greater attention to urban and subversive insurgency
than its predecessors. It also stresses that US neutrality in insurgencies "will be the norm." The new doctrine, though,
still argues that "success in counterinsurgency goes to the party that achieves the greater popular support," thus
continuing to view Third World conflict as a contest with Western notions of rationality.[15] It does not offer advice
on how to deal with gray area phenomena, "irrational" enemies for whom violence is not a means to political ends, or
what Ralph Peters calls "the new warrior class"--"erratic primitives of shifting allegiance, habituated to violence, with
no stake in civil order."[16]
John Keegan points out that cultures like the United States with a Clausewitzean belief in the connection of war and
politics often have difficulty comprehending, much less defeating, opponents with other motives.[17] It is the job of
experts in the military and defense community to help overcome this tendency. Some movement in this direction has
taken place. New joint doctrine, for instance, states that foreign internal defense "has traditionally been focused on
defeating an organized movement attempting to overthrow the government," but in the future "may address other
threats." Threats such as civil disorder, narcotrafficking, and terrorism "may, in fact, predominate in the future as
traditional power centers shift, suppressed cultural and ethnic rivalries surface, and the economic incentives of illegal
drug-trafficking continue."[18] To transcend the conceptual limits of the Cold War, insurgency should be considered
as simply protracted, organized violence--whether revolutionary or nonrevolutionary, political or nonpolitical, and
open or clandestine--which threatens security and requires a government response.
The second step should be the building of consensus on basic principles. Given the post-Cold War security
environment, four principles seem appropriate. One is rigid selectivity. The key factor when the United States
considers engaging in counterinsurgency support is whether the threatened state and regime warrants the effort. During

the Cold War, the simple fact that a noncommunist regime faced a communist challenge led us to engage in
counterinsurgency support. In the post-Cold War world, we can and must be much more discerning. The international
system is not domestic society where every citizen, no matter how reprehensible, deserves assistance. We should, in
other words, consider providing counterinsurgency support only when the threatened state is an existing democracy
rather than a potential one. Of course our standards for defining democracy must be somewhat flexible, but not to the
point of emptiness.
The second principle of our post-Cold War counterinsurgency strategy should be multilateralism. When engaging in
counterinsurgency, we should engineer an international support coalition both to enlarge the assistance available to the
threatened state and to avoid staking US credibility on the outcome of the conflict. Even though American
counterinsurgency strategy has long called for multinational efforts, we seldom attempted to be "one among equals"
but instead formed hierarchical coalitions where we clearly bore the brunt of the effort.[19] Horizontal coalitions
should be the way of the future. We might lead such coalitions in the Western Hemisphere, but rely on others
elsewhere.
The third principle should be concentration on secondary support. We could lead the way in deterring, isolating, and
punishing external sponsors of insurgency. Within a multinational counterinsurgency support coalition, we should
focus on our special skills and provide intelligence, mobility, planning support, and psychological operations training
rather than massive financial assistance or tactical training and advice. In general we should be a second-tier supporter
providing assistance to regional states with greater experience in counterinsurgency and a more direct stake in a
conflict (thus making them more likely to persist in a protracted struggle). After all, one of the things that made the
Soviet Union effective in sponsoring insurgency was reliance on surrogates like Cuba and North Vietnam. The United
States should heed this example.
The fourth principle of our post-Cold War counterinsurgency strategy should be organizational coherence. The United
States may need a new organization to confront new forms of insurgency. With the exception of secessionist-separatist
insurgency, all post-Cold War forms will be far removed from the Army's traditional areas of expertise and will be
more police functions than military ones. The Army should thus encourage the formation of a permanent civil-military
cadre of experts with a strong emphasis on law enforcement and intelligence collection and analysis. Rod Paschall's
argument that Western military forces are not proficient at counterinsurgency and should be replaced by "an
international corporation composed of former Western officers and soldiers skilled in acceptable counterinsurgency
techniques" rings even truer today than when written in 1990.[20]
What can the Army do to speed reconstitution should policymakers again deem counterinsurgency strategically
significant? Working closely with the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity
Conflict, the Army should use its intellectual resources to "keep the flame burning," at least at a low level. Sponsored
research, symposia, workshops, conferences, discussion papers, working groups, publications, and debate in the Army
educational system can contribute to this. The wargames, planning exercises, and case studies used in the Army's
professional educational system should consider commercial, subversive, and spiritual insurgency as well as Maoist
"people's war." The Army also should make sure it retains a cadre of counterinsurgency experts within its ranks during
downsizing. If we are lucky, no strategic rationale for extensive US involvement in counterinsurgency will emerge and
this cadre will never be activated. But it is the fate of the military to hope for the best and prepare for the worst. With
clear thinking now, the Army can be ready to offer effective advice should the strategic environment change and the
United States once again see a rationale for major involvement in counterinsurgency support.
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